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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
The principal question presented by this appeal is 
whether torts, breaches of contract, and state law crimes-- 
which are not enumerated in the Racketeering Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.S 1961(1) 
--can be predicate acts of racketeering upon which a 
plaintiff can base a civil RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. 
S 1964(c). We would have thought the answer to this 
question obvious, but, as evidenced by the case at bar, the 
question begs for definitive resolution. Accordingly, we take 
this opportunity to make clear that a plaintiff in a civil 
RICO action cannot rely on a breach of contract, tortious 
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interference with contract, or the Pennsylvania state law 
crime of theft by deception as predicate acts of racketeering 
activity under the federal RICO statute. 
 
The appeal also requires that we clarify the time at which 
a cause of action accrues for statute-of-limitations purposes 
under the civil RICO statute. We confirm that the "injury 
and pattern" discovery rule announced by this Court in 
Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir. 
1988), remains the law of the Circuit, notwithstanding the 
Supreme Court's decision in Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 
U.S. 179 (1997), which rejected an exception we had 
grafted on to Keystone's general rule. We note, however, 
that the Supreme Court has granted writ of certiorari in 
Rotella v. Wood, 147 F.3d 438 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 
119 S. Ct. 1139 (1999), and will likely decide this Term 
what rule will control in the future: the injury and pattern 
discovery rule employed by this court of appeals and 
others; the "pure injury discovery" rule employed by other 
courts of appeals; the "injury rule" endorsed by Justices 
Scalia and Thomas in Klehr, 521 U.S. at 198 (Scalia, J., 
concurring); or some other rule. 
 
Our determinations as to what constitutes a predicate act 
of racketeering activity and the time at which a civil RICO 
action accrues compel the conclusion that the District 
Court did not err in granting summary judgment for the 
defendants on plaintiffs-appellants' civil RICO claims. We 
further conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 
U.S.C. S 1367(c), by dismissing plaintiffs' pendent state law 
claims after their predicate federal claims had been 
dismissed. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court 
will be affirmed. 
 
I. Factual Background and Procedural History  
 
Doctors William Wright and Ananda Panikkar were 
friends and practicing physicians in Bloomsburg, 
Pennsylvania. Each owned adjoining land on the River Hill 
farm, where they grew Christmas trees for sale. Each man 
and his family also owned other tree farms. Wright's family 
formed a corporation to sell trees, Evergreen Express, Inc. 
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(Evergreen), while Panikkar sold trees under his own name. 
Until 1989, both families participated in the management of 
their farms but employed outside help to do much of the 
work. This arrangement proved erratic and generally 
unprofitable. 
 
In 1989, Wright contacted Dominick Annulli, who was 
experienced in the tree farm business, and told him that he 
needed someone to manage his farm and to maintain and 
sell his trees. Annulli and Wright signed a written contract 
prepared by Wright's son, Lawrence, a lawyer, which 
provided that for a four-year term Annulli would be 
responsible for maintaining and selling Evergreen's trees. In 
return, Annulli would receive any profits from those sales 
after he paid Evergreen a base fee for each tree sold. During 
the course of the negotiations, Wright introduced Annulli to 
Panikkar, who agreed orally to enter into a similar 
arrangement with Annulli. Annulli successfully managed 
the farms for the next two years. In addition to selling 
Christmas trees, he expanded the Wrights' and the 
Panikkars' businesses to the non-holiday season by 
developing a market in dug and balled nursery stock trees. 
This new venture proved quite profitable for the families 
and Annulli, and it enabled the farms to have a stream of 
income year-round. 
 
Not all remained merry, however, in the Christmas tree 
business. Annulli alleges that, although the Wrights' and 
Panikkars' farms were becoming quite successful, Wright's 
son, Lawrence, made Annulli's life miserable by constantly 
interfering with Annulli's management duties. Frustrated 
with Lawrence's intrusiveness, Annulli wrote to Wright and 
Evergreen on April 6, 1991, requesting that they terminate 
their agreement before the end of the term. Annulli's offer 
was not accepted, and he was told by the Wrights that they 
expected him to meet his obligations for the next two years. 
 
Four months later, the Wrights and Evergreen "accepted" 
Annulli's offer to terminate the contract. They did so after 
a summer during which Annulli had labored and spent his 
own money to maintain the Wrights' trees. Annulli submits 
that the Wrights' acceptance of his offer to terminate was 
not only legally invalid, but was motivated by the Wrights' 
unlawful desire to profit at his expense. Annulli submitted 
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an affidavit prepared by one George Bellum, who 
represented that Wright had offered him a job to manage 
the Wrights' farms while Annulli was still engaged in doing 
so. Bellum also asserted that Lawrence Wright explained 
that the reason for replacing Annulli with Bellum was that, 
under their contract, Annulli was making all the money and 
the Wrights wanted to reap these profits.1 Additionally, 
Bellum claimed that, after Annulli's contract was 
terminated, Lawrence Wright and his brother, Lee, tried to 
enlist Bellum in an attempt to use a price list stolen from 
Annulli to steal Annulli's customers for nursery stock trees. 
 
Believing that the Wrights' actions constituted a breach 
of contract, Annulli sued Evergreen in Pennsylvania state 
court in November 1991. The case was purged from the 
state court's docket after two years for lack of prosecution. 
While Annulli's case against Evergreen languished in state 
court, Annulli's contractual relationship with Panikkar 
continued. Wright, who lived next to one of Panikkar's 
farms, began calling Panikkar and informing him that 
Annulli was not maintaining the Panikkars' trees, and that 
he was cutting and selling their trees without informing 
him. Panikkar visited his tree farms, and upon discovering 
what he perceived to be neglect, informed Annulli that he 
needed to take better care to meet his contractual 
obligations. The neglect is said to have persisted, and 
Panikkar terminated his agreement with Annulli in the 
Spring of 1993. Since then, the Wrights have performed 
maintenance and managerial duties at the Panikkars' 
farms. 
 
In November 1994, Annulli filed suit against Panikkar 
and his wife in Pennsylvania state court for breach of 
contract.2 On June 4, 1996, Annulli deposed Panikkar, who 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. An accountant hired by Annulli prepared a report that supports 
Bellum's assertion that the Wrights wanted to appropriate Annulli's 
share of the profits. The accountant estimated that Annulli made roughly 
forty dollars on each tree he sold; under the terms of their contract, the 
Wrights made between $6.50 and $10 a tree. 
 
2. Annulli, his wife, and Annulli Nurseries were named as plaintiffs in 
the cases relevant to this appeal. As Mr. Annulli is the principal 
plaintiff, 
we refer to him alone. 
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testified regarding his connection with the Wrights and 
about Wright's reports that Annulli was not doing his job 
properly. Based on this deposition and an interpretation of 
Panikkar's testimony that led to the conclusion that the 
Wrights and Panikkars had conspired to defraud Annulli, 
Annulli filed an amended complaint on July 15, 1996. The 
complaint added Wright, his wife, two of their children, and 
Evergreen as defendants. Annulli pled breach of contract 
claims against the Panikkars; he asserted claims against 
Evergreen and the Wrights for tortious interference with the 
Panikkar-Annulli contract; and he alleged that the Wrights 
and Panikkars had engaged in conspiracy and defrauded 
him. Annulli demanded four million dollars in damages for 
anticipated lost profits from his share of the trees on the 
Panikkar farms which Annulli had planted and maintained, 
but which the Wrights and Panikkars were now selling. 
 
On June 24, 1996, Annulli began proceedings against the 
Wrights, Panikkars, and Evergreen (hereinafter "the 
Defendants") in the District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania; he averred civil RICO claims as well as 
pendent state law claims. (Annulli's counsel represented at 
oral argument that these state law claims are currently 
pending in state court.) In his RICO action, Annulli alleged 
that the Wrights and the Panikkars engaged in a conspiracy 
between 1983 and 1993 to steal Annulli's services and 
expertise. He alleged that he first discovered this conspiracy 
and pattern of racketeering during the June 4, 1996 
deposition of Panikkar. 
 
The Defendants moved for summary judgment, and the 
District Court granted it based on the statute-of-limitations 
defense they had advanced. The Court held that Annulli's 
civil RICO action against the Defendants accrued in 1991 
when the Wrights terminated their contract with Annulli 
and published an allegedly stolen price list. At this 
moment, the District Court concluded, Annulli knew or 
should have known the Defendants had engaged in acts 
forming the predicate acts of racketeering, on which a civil 
RICO claim could be based. Under this reasoning, since 
Annulli waited until 1996 to file suit to recover damages 
arising out of this alleged pattern of racketeering, his claim 
was time-barred by RICO's four-year statute of limitations. 
 
                                6 
  
In reaching this conclusion, the District Court rejected 
Annulli's arguments that he first discovered the RICO 
conspiracy against him during the June 6, 1996 deposition 
of Panikkar. The Court concluded that nothing in the 
deposition supported the contention that the Wrights and 
Panikkars had decided unlawfully to transfer management 
duties of the farm to the Wrights; therefore, there was 
nothing for Annulli to discover. Moreover, even if the 
deposition contained new evidence that the Wrights 
persuaded the Panikkars to terminate their contract with 
Annulli: (1) the Court suggested that this act did not 
constitute a predicate RICO violation, but merely tortious 
interference with contract; and (2) it concluded that even if 
there were a RICO violation, the statute of limitations would 
not start running upon its discovery, but upon the 
discovery of the first act of the conspiracy and its attendant 
injury--the Wrights' 1991 decision to terminate its 
agreement with Annulli and publish a stolen price list. 
Having dismissed Annulli's federal claims, the Court 
exercised its discretion to dismiss his pendent claims as 
well. 
 
Annulli appealed. We have appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. The District Court had 
subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. S 1964(c) and 
28 U.S.C. SS 1331 and 1367.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The District Court disposed of all of Annulli's civil RICO claims on 
summary judgment. We exercise plenary review over such a decision, see 
Olson v. General Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951 (3d Cir. 1996), and 
apply the same test the District Court should have applied in the first 
instance, see Lawrence v. National Westminster Bank, New Jersey, 98 
F.3d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 1996). We must therefore determine whether the 
record, when viewed in the light most favorable to Annulli, shows that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that defendants are 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Salley v. Circuit City 
Stores, 
Inc., 160 F.3d 977, 980 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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II. The Defendants' Statute-of-Limitations Defense 
 
A. The Applicable Accrual Rule for Civil RICO Claims 
 
In enacting RICO, Congress did not include a statute-of- 
limitations provision for private civil claims arising under 
the statute. The Supreme Court filled this gap in Agency 
Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 
143, 156 (1987), holding that civil RICO actions are subject 
to the four-year statute-of-limitations provision that 
governs private civil antitrust actions. The Court in Malley- 
Duff, however, did not announce when a civil RICO action 
"accrues"--i.e., the time at which the four-year statute of 
limitations begins to run. 
 
The courts of appeals have adjudicated this question, but 
a split in authority has developed. In Keystone Ins. Co. v. 
Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125, 1130 (3d Cir. 1988), we 
announced the "injury and pattern discovery" rule. The rule 
provides that a civil RICO claim accrues and the statute of 
limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knew or should 
have known that each element of a civil RICO claim existed 
--namely, that he was injured, that the defendant was the 
source of this injury, and that a pattern of activity 
prohibited by RICO caused this harm. See id.; see also 
Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 185 (1997) (noting 
that the 8th, 10th, and 11th Circuits follow this approach). 
Other courts of appeals have adopted the "pure injury 
discovery" rule; it does not require that the plaintiff have 
knowledge of a pattern of racketeering activity before the 
statute begins to run, but holds instead that a civil RICO 
cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers or 
should have discovered his injury. See Klehr, 521 U.S. at 
191; see also id. at 185-86 (noting that the 1st, 2d, 4th, 
7th, 9th, and likely the D.C. Circuits follow this approach); 
Rotella v. Wood, 147 F.3d 438 (5th Cir. 1998) (following this 
approach). 
 
The Supreme Court seemed poised to resolve this circuit 
split in Klehr. Instead of doing so, however, the Court 
merely eliminated an exception to one of the two 
contending theories. The Klehr majority rejected this court's 
"last predicate act" exception to our general injury and 
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pattern discovery rule, see Keystone, 863 F.2d at 1130, 
while explicitly refusing to endorse either the injury and 
pattern discovery rule or the pure injury discovery rule. See 
Klehr, 521 U.S. at 182, 191.4 As Klehr purposefully avoided 
endorsing our general accrual rule in Keystone or rejecting 
it in favor of an alternative, Keystone remains the law of 
this Circuit unless and until the Supreme Court (or our 
court en banc) says otherwise. In applying Keystone, we 
note that it is the most lenient accrual rule among the 
remaining contenders. If the Court were to reject it in favor 
of a stricter rule, it would only be more difficult for Annulli 
to show that his claim is not time-barred.5 Therefore, we do 
not hesitate in applying Keystone, as we feel confident that 
whatever result the Court reaches this Term in Rotella v. 
Wood, 147 F.3d 438 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. 
Ct. 1139 (1999); see also supra Introduction (discussing 
Rotella), the outcome of this case would remain the same. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Our last predicate act exception, created in Keystone, 863 F.2d at 
1130, allowed 
 
       actions based on injuries occurring outside the limitations period 
if 
       injuries that are derived from the same pattern of racketeering are 
       within the limitations period. Likewise, predicate acts which 
[were] 
       committed within the limitations period should provide a basis for 
       civil RICO actions to redress a RICO injury occurring prior to the 
       limitations period . . . . 
 
The Supreme Court rejected this rule because it provided plaintiffs with 
little incentive to investigate their claims. It also let the plaintiffs 
sit on 
their rights indefinitely and use the new predicate acts "as a bootstrap 
to recover for injuries caused by other earlier predicate acts that took 
place outside the limitations period." Klehr, 521 U.S. at 190. 
 
5. The Court in Klehr described Keystone's injury plus pattern discovery 
rule as a "larger hole" through which civil RICO plaintiffs would have to 
fit their cases and the pure injury discovery rule as a "smaller one." 
Klehr, 521 U.S. at 192. The third rule mentioned in Klehr creates a 
smaller hole still. Concurring, Justice Scalia noted that he would have 
adopted as the civil RICO accrual rule, the Clayton Act pure injury rule, 
which provides that a "cause of action accrues and the statute begins to 
run when a defendant commits an act that injures a plaintiff's business." 
See id. at 197-98. 
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B. The Injury and Pattern Discovery Rule Applied to 
Annulli's Claims 
 
In applying Keystone, we must discern when Annulli was 
injured, when he knew or should have known about these 
injuries, and when he knew or should have known about 
the source and alleged pattern of racketeering that caused 
his injuries. Annulli has complicated matters by advancing 
alternative theories regarding the time at which the alleged 
Wright-Panikkar conspiracy arose, the exact predicate acts 
of racketeering that harmed him, and the time at which he 
did or should have discovered this conspiracy and its 
resulting harms. 
 
Annulli's theory of the Wright-Panikkar conspiracy and 
pattern of racketeering can be summarized as follows. In 
1983, Wright convinced his wife and family and the 
Panikkars to buy land for Christmas tree farms. In 1989, 
Wright, in bad faith, contracted with Annulli in an attempt 
to learn and eventually steal his business secrets; Wright 
then encouraged Panikkar to do the same. The Wrights and 
the Panikkars then made misrepresentations to Annulli 
that convinced Annulli to render services on their behalf. 
Once the Wrights and Panikkars had learned Annulli's 
secrets, stolen his price lists, and exploited his labor, 
Wright then caused Evergreen to breach its contract with 
Annulli, and soon after, convinced the Panikkars to do 
likewise. With Annulli out of the way, the two doctors and 
their families could now take a greater share in the profits 
of their tree businesses and steal Annulli's customers. 
 
Annulli claims three separate injuries arising out of these 
alleged conspiratorial activities. The first harm is said to 
have taken place when the Wrights terminated Evergreen's 
contract with Annulli in 1991 and used a price list stolen 
from Annulli to sell a product that Annulli had developed 
for the Wrights--the highly profitable dug and balled 
nursery stock trees--to Annulli's nursery customers. This 
harm would have arisen in 1991, when these alleged 
misdeeds took place. Annulli's second claim is that he 
relied on the Panikkars' and Wrights' fraudulent 
representations that they would be in the tree business for 
a long time, and thus devoted time, money, skill, and labor 
to working on the Defendants' farms. This purported harm 
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--years of hard work exchanged for false promises-- 
continued to accrue as long as Annulli worked with the two 
families: from 1989 to 1991 in the Wrights' case, and from 
1989 to 1993 in the Panikkars' case. The final harm that 
Annulli allegedly suffered is his lost ability, under Annulli's 
separate contracts with the Wrights and the Panikkars, to 
sell the trees he planted and maintained. Under this 
liability theory, the Wrights harmed Annulli when they 
canceled their contract in 1991; the Panikkars harmed 
Annulli in 1993 when they did the same. 
 
Under this court's pattern and injury discovery rule, 
Annulli's action on his first claim of injury is time barred. 
Annulli's putative civil RICO action against the Wrights for 
terminating their contract, stealing a price list, and faxing 
it across state lines in an effort to lure away Annulli's 
customers arises out of injuries and an alleged pattern of 
racketeering activity that took place during and before 
1991. (Whether these acts would constitute a pattern of 
racketeering activity for RICO purposes is discussed in Part 
III, infra, in which we conclude that they likely do.) 
According to an affidavit prepared by Annulli, he 
discovered, in 1991, (1) that they were injured; (2) that the 
Wrights and Evergreen were the source of this injury; and 
(3) as explained in the margin, that the Wrights and 
Evergreen engaged in a pattern of activity to steal Annulli's 
price lists and customers.6 Because Annulli knew of these 
three facts in 1991, an action on these claims accrued in 
1991, see Keystone, 863 F.2d at 1130, and hence his 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In an affidavit, signed April 21, 1997, Dominick Annulli swore that 
 
       [s]oon after the defendant Wrights terminated our contract and 
       denied me access to the trees that I planted and maintained, I was 
       contacted by one of my larger customers, Shemin Nurseries, Inc., 
       located in Connecticut, and they advised me that the defendant, 
       Evergreen Express, Inc., had faxed a new price list to Shemin's 
       office offering cut trees as well as dug and balled nursery trees. 
       . . . In the same time period, . . . [the Defendants] were 
attempting 
       to steal my customers. 
 
George Bellum, who submitted an affidavit on Annulli's behalf, averred 
that the price list the Wrights sent to Annulli's customers was stolen 
from Annulli. 
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attempt in June 1996 to remedy these injuries is barred by 
civil RICO's four-year statute of limitations. 
 
Since Klehr rejected our last predicate act rule, see supra 
note 4, Annulli cannot rely on new injuries arising out of 
predicate acts of racketeering within the four years 
preceding June 1996 to recover for any injuries caused by 
these "earlier predicate acts that took place outside the 
limitations period." Klehr, 521 U.S. at 190. Therefore, the 
District Court rightly granted summary judgment in favor 
of the Wrights and Evergreen on this first--and untimely-- 
set of claims. 
 
Annulli's other two sets of claims cannot be disposed of 
as easily. As Klehr also teaches, plaintiffs in civil RICO 
actions may seek redress for new injuries arising out of 
new predicate acts that occur within the statutory period, 
even if those new predicate acts and resulting injuries arise 
out of the same pattern of racketeering behavior that began 
outside the four-year statutory period. See Klehr, 521 U.S. 
at 189-90 (noting that under the "separate accrual" rule, 
adopted by some courts of appeals and applicable in 
antitrust law, plaintiffs could recover for new predicate acts 
occurring within the statutory period if they could show 
that the new acts could have caused them harm over and 
above the harm that the earlier acts caused). As explained 
above, the only limitation on this separate accrual rule is 
that these new acts cannot be used "as a bootstrap to 
recover for injuries caused by other earlier predicate acts 
that took place outside the statutory period." Id. 
 
Under this framework, which is consistent with 
Keystone's general rule, Annulli's second and third claims 
would be timely, assuming that they were based on valid 
predicate acts of racketeering. The Defendants allegedly 
injured Annulli in 1993, when Wright purportedly 
convinced Panikkar to terminate his contract with Annulli 
and employ the Wrights to manage his farm. Annulli's years 
of labor for the Panikkars were now for naught because he 
could not share in the profits from the sales of the trees he 
planted and maintained, as was his contractual right. 
 
Both of these injuries occurred within four years of the 
time that Annulli filed his civil RICO claims in June 1996, 
 
                                12 
  
and thus, the District Court erred in holding them 
untimely. The District Court rested its decision on the 
conclusion that Annulli was on notice of the Wright- 
Panikkar conspiracy when the Wrights terminated the 
contract and stole the price list in 1991. As the record 
demonstrates, however, Annulli continued to work with the 
Panikkars for the next two years without any indication 
that the Wrights and Panikkars were conspiring until either 
1993, when the Panikkars canceled their contract, or 1996, 
when Annulli took Panikkar's deposition. Both of these 
discovery dates are within the four-year statutory period 
and fall under the separate accrual applied by the Court in 
Klehr. Therefore, the District Court erred in granting 
summary judgment for these claims on statute-of- 
limitations grounds. 
 
III. Can State Law Crimes, Torts, and Breaches of 
Contract Constitute Predicate Acts of Racketeering  
 
We may affirm a District Court's summary judgment 
ruling on different grounds, "provided the issue which 
forms the basis of our decision was before the lower court." 
Morse v. Lower Merion School District, 132 F.3d 902, 904 
n.1 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Salley v. Circuit City Stores, 
Inc., 160 F.3d 977, 978 (3d Cir. 1998). In moving for 
summary judgment, the Defendants presented several 
alternative theories on which the District Court could 
dismiss Annulli's civil RICO claims. In addition to the 
statute-of-limitations argument adopted by the District 
Court, the Defendants contended that (1) the Panikkars' 
breach of their contract with Annulli, and the Wrights' 
alleged interference with that contract were not predicate 
acts of racketeering necessary for a civil RICO claim; (2) 
Annulli's alleged four million dollars of lost profits from 
future sales of trees on the Panikkars' farms were not 
proximately caused by the alleged RICO violation; and (3) 
Panikkar's wife and Wright's wife and daughter had nothing 
to do with the conspiracy. We focus our attention on the 
first of these arguments, because its resolution is 
dispositive of the remainder of Annulli's civil RICO claims. 
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A. Annulli's Evidentiary Burden at 
Summary Judgment 
 
Annulli's civil RICO claims arise under 18 U.S.C. 
SS 1962(c) and (d). Section 1962(c) provides that it is 
"unlawful for any person employed by or associated with 
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, 
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, 
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's 
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity." Under 
S 1962(d), it is unlawful "for any person to conspire to 
violate any of the provisions" of subsection (c). Therefore, to 
prove a conspiracy claim under S 1962(d), Annulli must 
first establish his S 1962(c) claim. 
 
To recover under S 1962(c), a plaintiff must prove the 
following four elements: (1) the existence of an enterprise 
affecting interstate commerce; (2) that the defendant was 
employed by or associated with the enterprise; (3) that the 
defendant participated, either directly or indirectly, in the 
conduct or the affairs of the enterprise; and (4) that the 
defendant participated through a pattern of racketeering 
activity that included at least two racketeering acts. See 
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985); 
Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162, 1165 (3d 
Cir. 1989). At the summary judgment stage of proceedings, 
if the movant--in this case the Defendants--can point to 
the absence of any factual support for one of these 
essential elements, then the non-movant, bearing the 
burden of persuasion at trial, must introduce specific facts 
showing a need for trial, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). 
See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24. If the non-moving party 
fails to go beyond conclusory allegations in its pleadings 
and to produce specific facts indicating that there is a 
genuine issue for trial, summary judgment will be granted 
in favor of the moving party. See id. at 323-24; Pastore v. 
Bell Telephone Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994). 
As noted above, we construe the record in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party. See supra note 3. 
 
B. What Types of Acts Qualify as 
Racketeering Activity? 
 
The Defendants point to an absence of factual support for 
the fourth element of Annulli's S 1962(c) civil RICO claim-- 
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i.e., that the Defendants engaged in a pattern of 
racketeering activity. The Defendants argue that with 
respect to his last two claims of injury--those accruing in 
1993--Annulli has, at most, provided factual support for 
state contract, tort, and criminal claims, but has not 
introduced any evidence of "racketeering activity" as it is 
defined by 18 U.S.C. S 1961(1). 
 
The relevant portion of S 1961(1) defining "racketeering 
activity" provides, inter alia, that the term encompasses 
 
       (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, 
       gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in 
       obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance or 
       listed chemical . . . , which is chargeable under State 
       law and punishable by imprisonment for more than 
       one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of 
       the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: 
       . . . section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 
       (relating to wire fraud), . . . sections 2314 and 2315 
       (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), 
       . . . 
 
18 U.S.C. S 1961(1). In Tabas v. Tabas, 47 F.3d 1280, 1290 
(3d Cir. 1995) (en banc), we noted that Congress's inclusion 
of mail and wire fraud in subsection (1)(B) strikes some 
observers as sweeping "common law or `garden variety' 
fraud" claims that are normally "the subject of commercial 
litigation" into a statutory scheme aimed at punishing 
defendants who engage in crimes traditionally associated 
with racketeering, such as those enumerated in section 
(1)(A): murder, kidnapping, gambling, extortion, and the 
like. As Tabas recognized, however, we are bound by 
RICO's text and "the Supreme Court's instruction that 
`RICO is to be read broadly' "; therefore,"RICO, with its 
severe penalties, may be applicable to many `garden-variety' 
fraud cases, . . . particularly considering the judiciary's 
broad interpretation of the mail fraud statute." Id. at 1296- 
97. 
 
That said, Annulli has provided no evidence establishing 
that the Defendants engaged in racketeering activity within 
the statutory period. More particularly, Annulli has made 
no allegation that the Defendants committed one of the 
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state law crimes defined as racketeering activity in 
S 1961(1)(A). He argues instead that the Defendants are 
guilty of the Pennsylvania state law crime of "theft by 
deception," 18 PA. CONS. STAT. S 3922, for stealing Annulli's 
services in managing the tree farms. Even if Annulli could 
make this showing, theft by deception, like a simple breach 
of contract or intentional interference with contract, is not 
a predicate act of racketeering activity enumerated in 
S 1961(1).7 Even thoughS 1961 and its mail and wire fraud 
predicates have been interpreted with flexibility, see Tabas, 
47 F.3d at 1297, courts discussing the state crime of theft, 
and its analogues, have refused to read it intoS 1961's 
expansive list.8 
 
This is for good reason. First, RICO's list of acts 
constituting predicate acts of racketeering activity is 
exhaustive. See, e.g., Harvey v. Harvey , 931 F. Supp. 127, 
130 (D. Conn. 1996); Red Ball Interior Demolition Corp. v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. See Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 140 F.3d 494 (3d 
Cir. 1998) ("[D]efendant's heavy-handed business tactics, . . . while 
relevant to a tortious interference claim, cannot be made to fit within 
the 
statutory and doctrinal constraints of the mail and wire fraud 
statutes."); 
Blount Financial Services, Inc. v. Walter E. Heller and Co., 819 F.2d 151, 
152-53 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that absent specific allegations of 
intentional fraud, "[s]ending a financial statement which misconstrues 
the prime rate provided by the terms of the contract may breach the 
contract but it does not amount to a RICO mail fraud cause of action."). 
 
8. See, e.g., United States v. Napoli, 54 F.3d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(finding 
that "despite the broad range of criminal offenses designated by the 
money laundering statute, the crime of theft, standing alone, is not a 
specified unlawful activity. It is neither a federal crime listed in 
sections 
1956 and 1961, nor one of the state-law offenses that constitute RICO 
predicate acts."); Toms v. Pizzo, 4 F. Supp. 2d 178, 183 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) 
(noting that "simple theft is not one of the crimes constituting a 
predicate act for purposes of establishing a pattern of racketeering 
activity"); Buck Creek Coal, Inc. v. United Mine Workers, 917 F. Supp. 
601, 612 (S.D. Ind. 1995) ("[T]heft is not the type of act that forms a 
predicate act under RICO."); Bonton v. Archer Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 
889 F. Supp. 995, 1002 (S.D. Tex. 1995) ("Under RICO, . . . acts that 
constitute theft under state law are not predicate acts for racketeering 
activity. . . . A plaintiff may not convert state law claims into a 
federal 
treble damage action simply by alleging that wrongful acts are a pattern 
of racketeering related to an enterprise."). 
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Palmadessa, 874 F. Supp. 576, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). To 
read it otherwise would be to usurp the role of Congress in 
drafting statutes. Second, if garden-variety state law 
crimes, torts, and contract breaches were to constitute 
predicate acts of racketeering (along with mail and wire 
fraud), civil RICO law, which is already a behemoth, would 
swallow state civil and criminal law whole. Virtually every 
litigant would have the incentive to file their breach of 
contract and tort claims under the federal civil RICO Act, as 
treble damages and attorney's fees would be in sight. We 
will not read language into S 1961 to federalize every state 
tort, contract, and criminal law action. 
 
As for those predicate acts listed in the statute, Annulli 
has provided no evidence that the Defendants engaged in 
S 1961(1)(B) mail fraud, wire fraud, or interstate 
transportation of stolen property during the four-year 
statutory period. He has adduced evidence that the Wrights 
stole Annulli's price list in 1991 and faxed it from 
Pennsylvania to one of Annulli's customers in Connecticut. 
See supra note 6. This may have the makings of wire fraud 
and interstate transportation of stolen property, which are 
enumerated predicate acts of racketeering in S 1961(1)(B). 
As noted in Section II.B, supra, however, a 1996 civil RICO 
action arising out of this predicate act is untimely by one 
year. That leaves Annulli with the Wrights' and Panikkars' 
alleged acts of conspiracy and racketeering in 1993 both to 
defraud Annulli of his labor and contractual rights with 
Panikkar, and to share the profits from tree sales to which 
Annulli was entitled. This intentionally fraudulent activity, 
if proven, might constitute mail or wire fraud if Annulli 
could also provide sufficient evidence that the Defendants 
used inter- or intrastate mail or interstate wire in 
furtherance of this scheme.9 This they have not done. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. There are two elements of a mail or wire fraud charge: "(a) a scheme 
to defraud, and (2) a mailing or wire in furtherance of that scheme." 
Greenberg v. Brewster, 816 F. Supp. 1039, 1049 (E.D. Pa. 1993). Wholly 
intrastate use of the mails for fraud violates the mail fraud statute. 
See, 
e.g., In re Burzynski, 989 F.2d 733, 742 (5th Cir. 1993). In contrast, the 
federal wire fraud statute requires interstate use of the wire. See, e.g., 
Smith v. Ayers, 845 F.2d 1360, 1366 (5th Cir. 1988) ("As several courts 
have recognized, the statute requires that the wire communication cross 
state lines."). 
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Annulli sufficiently pled the elements of mail and wire 
fraud violations to survive judgment on the pleadings, but 
since then, he has introduced nothing into the record 
establishing that, "incident to an essential part of their 
scheme" to defraud him, Tabas, 47 F.3d 1294 n.18, the 
Defendants (1) mailed anything to one other or to Annulli, 
or (2) had phone communications with each other or with 
Annulli across state lines. The only mailings that Annulli 
has referenced include checks mailed to him for trees sold 
before 1991 and the 1991 letter the Wrights wrote to him 
terminating their contract. These mailings, while potentially 
acts of mail fraud under this court's expansive 
interpretation of the statute, see id., are outside the 
statutory period, see supra Section II.B. 
 
All other communications between the parties appear to 
have occurred face to face or during intrastate telephone 
conversations, which are not covered under the wire fraud 
act. See supra note 9. Panikkar terminated his contract 
with Annulli in person. Wright informed Panikkar of 
Annulli's negligent work--and purportedly at the same time 
conspired with him to defraud Annulli--in a series of 
telephone conversations that were presumably intrastate, 
given that the two physicians are Bloomsburg, 
Pennsylvania neighbors. Annulli presented no evidence that 
these conversations between the Wrights and the 
Panikkars, or any other conversation in furtherance of their 
conspiracy to defraud Annulli, took place across interstate 
phone lines, as we detail in the margin.10  Accordingly, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. In his Reply Brief, Annulli asserts that such evidence can be found 
in his brief opposing summary judgment before the District Court. In 
those papers, Annulli claims that "[t]here were hundreds of calls to [him] 
from all over the country, outside the State of Pennsylvania requesting 
that he work faster and work harder for each of the Defendants." Annulli 
cites his own January 6, 1998 deposition at pages 89-91 to support this 
claim. On review, these pages contain no discussion regarding interstate 
phone calls made to Annulli by the Defendants. Instead, they include a 
discussion regarding the indemnity clause in Annulli's contract with the 
Wrights. 
 
Annulli further asserted in his summary judgment opposition brief 
that "the Wrights operated their business schemes from Lake Placid, 
Florida during the winter months." From this, he would presumably have 
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Annulli's civil RICO claims based on predicate acts of wire 
and mail fraud, which are unsupported by any record 
evidence, cannot survive summary judgment.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
us draw the inference that the Wrights called Annulli and furthered their 
scheme to defraud him over interstate phone lines. To support the 
contention giving rise to this inference, Annulli cites Exhibits 41 and 42 
from the trial record and Joanne Wright's February 22, 1998 deposition 
in its entirety. This evidence similarly fails to establish an issue of 
material fact regarding Annulli's mail and wire fraud allegations. Exhibit 
41 is a phone bill of an unidentified person or company dated April 10, 
1990, on which a March 20, 1990 phone call is logged to Lake Placid, 
Florida. Exhibit 42 is a canceled check written on March 11, 1989 from 
Evergreen to United Telephone. Neither of these documents even begins 
to prove that Wrights used interstate wire in furtherance of a conspiracy 
to defraud Annulli, absent some explanation in the record as to why this 
telephone bill and canceled check have anything to do with the 
Defendants' alleged racketeering activity. Cf. Scheiner v. Wallace, 860 F. 
Supp. 991, 997-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting that, when alleging mail and 
wire fraud as predicate acts in a RICO claim, plaintiff's pleadings must 
identify the purpose of the mailing within the defendant's fraudulent 
scheme and specify the fraudulent statement, the time, place, and 
speaker and content of the alleged misrepresentations). Even if Annulli 
did offer such explanations, the predicate acts of racketeering they would 
tend to prove are well outside the statutory period. As for Joanne 
Wright's 220 page deposition, it too provides Annulli with no assistance. 
It makes not one mention of the Wrights operating their tree business 
from Florida during the winter months; instead, it primarily contains 
extensive discussions regarding the Wrights' unprofitable tree business 
before they hired Annulli. 
 
11. Annulli bemoans the fact that the Defendants"repeatedly refused to 
turn over their telephone records as requested by him during discovery." 
With these telephone records, Annulli suggests, he could have proven 
that some of the allegedly conspiratorial telephone conversations were 
conducted interstate. This is the wrong time to raise such an objection. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f) affords a party opposing summary judgment, who 
has not had the time or means to discover facts necessary to defeat the 
motion, the ability to ask the court to grant a continuance or deny the 
motion altogether. The rule "specifies the procedure to be followed, and 
explicitly provides that the party must file an affidavit setting forth 
why 
the time is needed." Pastore v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 
510-11 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
Annulli has filed no such affidavit. His failure to do so "is usually 
fatal," because by not filing a Rule 56(f) affidavit, a plaintiff fails to 
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In sum, because Annulli has not produced any evidence 
showing that the Defendants engaged in a predicate act of 
racketeering within the statutory period, both hisS 1962(c) 
pattern of racketeering claims and his S 1962(d) conspiracy 
to racketeer claims were rightly rejected as a matter of law. 
We affirm the District Court's decision to grant summary 
judgment on Annulli's civil RICO claims in favor of the 
Defendants. 
 
IV. The Dismissal of Annulli's Pendent 
State Law Claims 
 
Rejecting Annulli's civil RICO claims leaves his pendent 
state law claims against the Panikkars for breach of 
contract and those against the Wrights and Evergreen for 
intentional interference with contract. As noted above, the 
District Court dismissed these pendent claims after it 
granted summary judgment on Annulli's touchstone federal 
claims. Annulli argues that this decision was in error. 
 
The supplemental jurisdiction statute governs our review. 
The statute provides that "[t]he district court may decline to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim" if "the 
district court has dismissed all claims over which it has 
original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. S 1367(c)(3). This 
administrative decision is left to the sound discretion of the 
district court, and we review such determinations for abuse 
of discretion, focusing on whether the dismissal of the 
pendent claims best serves the principles of judicial 
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. See Queen 
City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 444 
(3d Cir. 1997); cf. Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 




preserve his objection. Id. at 511. Pastore mentioned a possible exception 
to the affidavit requirement in cases in which the non-moving party 
"constructively" made a Rule 56(f) motion in his papers opposing 
summary judgment. Id. Annulli made no mention of a discovery 
insufficiency in his papers; in fact, he claimed that "clear evidence" 
established the existence of criminal acts of mail and wire fraud. This 
clear evidence of course proved illusory, see supra note 10, and Annulli's 
eagerness to rest on it effectively waived any Rule 56(f) claim. 
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Annulli argues that two years of litigation, fifteen pages of 
court docket, 1,800 pages of deposition testimony, and 
2,800 pages of discovery documents militate in favor of 
retaining jurisdiction over his case, especially as he was on 
the eve of trial when the Defendants filed their motion for 
summary judgment. Although district courts have chosen 
to retain pendent jurisdiction in similar situations,12 courts 
of appeals have acknowledged the authority of district 
courts to refuse to do so.13 
 
Here, we do the same. Although Annulli has spent a great 
deal of time engaged in discovery, as the Defendants point 
out, Annulli can use this evidence to pursue his state law 
claims currently pending in state court. Therefore, the 
judicial economy and convenience factors do not suggest 
that the Court's decision was an abuse of discretion. As for 
the fairness factor, Pitchell, supra note 13, is instructive: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. See, e.g., Doddy v. Oxy USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 448, 455-56 (5th Cir. 
1996) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in 
declining 
to remand pendent claims, where lawsuit had been in litigation for more 
than two years, trial date was less than one month away, parties had 
filed more than 300 pleadings, most parties had prepared extensive 
discovery disclosures, summary judgment motions were pending, and 
remaining causes of action did not raise any novel or unsettled issues of 
state law); Timm v. Mead Corp., 32 F.3d 273, 276-77 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(accord, on similar facts). 
 
13. In Kennedy v. Schoenberg, Fisher & Newman, Ltd., 140 F.3d 716, 
728 (7th Cir. 1998), for example, the court of appeals held that it would 
not "second-guess" the district court's discretionary decision to decline 
to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims after 
plaintiff's federal claims were dismissed, even though the district judge 
was familiar with both the facts and law of the case and the parties had 
undertaken discovery. The court described the district court's decision as 
" `almost unreviewable,' especially when all federal claims have been 
dropped from the case before trial and only state law claims remain." Id. 
(citation omitted). Similarly, in Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 549 (2d 
Cir. 1994), the court of appeals upheld the district court's decision, 
made shortly before trial, to dismiss plaintiff's pendent claims after it 
had disposed of plaintiff's federal claims. The court explained this 
result, 
writing that it was "not persuaded by [plaintiff's] argument that he is 
being prejudiced by the delay resulting from the necessary pursuit of his 
state-law claims in state court. . . . When [plaintiff] brought his state-
law 
claims in federal court, he must have realized that the jurisdiction he 
invoked was pendent and possibly tentative." Id. (citation omitted). 
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Annulli and his lawyers knowingly risked dismissal of his 
pendent claims when they filed suit in federal district court 
and invoked the Court's discretionary supplemental 
jurisdiction power. Lastly, comity favors allowing the state 
court to hear Annulli's state law claims. On review of these 
factors, we find no abuse of discretion and accordingly 
affirm the Court's decision not to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction under S 1367(c).14 
 
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. 
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14. In an attempt to avoid this result, Annulli cites our decision in 
Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, 983 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1993). 
Annulli's reliance on that case is misplaced. In Growth Horizons, the 
district court had already held a trial on the merits and heard all of the 
evidence necessary to reach a decision on plaintiff's state law claim. See 
id. at 1285. Before rendering judgment on this claim, the district court 
mistakenly dismissed it along with the underlying federal claim for want 
of subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 1284. We reversed this 
decision, 
held that plaintiff's federal law claims were without merit, and 
instructed 
the district court to exercise its discretion under 28 U.S.C. S 1367(c) to 
determine whether judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the 
parties dictated that the district court decide plaintiff's surviving 
pendent 
claims. See id. In passing, we suggested that " `if the dismissal of the 
main claim occurs late in the action, . . . knocking[the dependant 
claims] down with a belated rejection of supplemental jurisdiction may 
not be fair.' " Id. at 1285 (citation omitted). We did not say that on the 
facts presented, however, the district court must hear the pendent 
claims given these fairness concerns. In Annulli's case, a trial has not 
been had, and the District Court cannot render judgment on Annulli's 
state law claims without further litigation. Moreover, the Court has 
already exercised its judgment and decided that a trial on the state 
claims is not warranted. 
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